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Abstract
Inner speech has been implicated in important aspects of normal and atypical cognition, including the development of
auditory hallucinations. Studies to date have focused on covert speech elicited by simple word or sentence repetition, while
ignoring richer and arguably more psychologically significant varieties of inner speech. This study compared neural activation
for inner speech involving conversations (‘dialogic inner speech’) with single-speaker scenarios (‘monologic inner speech’).
Inner speech-related activation differences were then compared with activations relating to Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning
and visual perspective-taking in a conjunction design. Generation of dialogic (compared with monologic) scenarios was
associated with a widespread bilateral network including left and right superior temporal gyri, precuneus, posterior cingulate
and left inferior and medial frontal gyri. Activation associated with dialogic scenarios and ToM reasoning overlapped in areas
of right posterior temporal cortex previously linked to mental state representation. Implications for understanding verbal
cognition in typical and atypical populations are discussed.
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Introduction
Inner speech—the experience of silent, verbal thinking—has
been implicated in many cognitive functions, including prob-
lem-solving, creativity and self-regulation (Morin, 2009;
Fernyhough, 2013; Alderson-Day and Fernyhough, 2015a), and
disruptions to the ‘internal monologue’ have been linked to
varieties of pathology, including hallucinations and depression
(Frith, 1992; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2004). Enhanced understanding
of inner speech hence has implications for understanding of
both typical and atypical cognition. Although interest in inner
speech has grown in recent years (Morin et al., 2011; Williams
et al., 2012; Fernyhough, 2013), conceptual and methodological
challenges have limited what is known about the neural proc-
esses underpinning this common experience.
Most neuroimaging studies to date have operationalized inner
speech as a unitary phenomenon equivalent to a first-person
monologue (Hinke et al., 1993; Simons et al., 2010). Methods of elic-
iting inner speech have typically involved either subvocal recita-
tion (e.g. covertly repeating ‘You are a x’ in response to a cue;
McGuire et al., 1995) or prompting participants to make phono-
logical judgements about words using inner speech (such as which
syllable to stress in pronunciation; Aleman et al., 2005). Such stud-
ies have shown recruitment during inner speech of areas associ-
ated with overt speech production and comprehension, such as
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left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), supplementary motor area (SMA)
and the superior and middle temporal gyri (McGuire et al., 1996;
Shergill et al., 2002; Aleman et al., 2005).
However, inner speech is a complex and varied phenom-
enon. In behavioural studies, everyday inner speech is often re-
ported to be involved in self-awareness, past and future
thinking and emotional reflection (D’Argembeau et al., 2011;
Morin et al., 2011), while in cognitive research, inner speech ap-
pears to fulfill a variety of mnemonic and regulatory functions
(e.g. Emerson and Miyake, 2003; see Alderson-Day and
Fernyhough, 2015a, for a review). Vygotsky (1987) posited that
inner speech reflects the endpoint of a developmental process
in which social dialogues, mediated by language, are internal-
ized as verbal thought. Following from this view, the subjective
experience of inner speech will mirror the external experience
of communication and often have a dialogic structure
(Fernyhough, 1996, 2004), involving the co-articulation of differ-
ing perspectives on reality and, in some cases, representation of
others’ voices. Evidence for the validity of these distinctions is
provided by findings from a self-report instrument, the varieties
of inner speech questionnaire (VISQ: McCarthy-Jones and
Fernyhough, 2011). Studies with student samples have docu-
mented high rates of endorsement (>75%) for inner speech
involving dialogue rather than monologue, alongside a number
of other phenomenological variations (Alderson-Day et al., 2014;
Alderson-Day and Fernyhough, 2015b).
Recognizing this complexity of inner speech, particularly its
conversational and social features, is important both for ecolo-
gical validity (Fernyhough, 2013) and for understanding atypical
cognition (Fernyhough, 2004). Auditory verbal hallucinations
(AVH) have been proposed to reflect misattributed instances of
inner speech (Bentall, 1990; Frith, 1992), but studies inspired by
this view have arguably relied on a relatively impoverished,
‘monologic’ view of inner speech. In the context of a growing
recognition of social and conversational dimensions of AVH
(Bell, 2013; Ford et al., 2014), knowing more about the heterogen-
eity of inner speech could enhance AVH models (Jones and
Fernyhough, 2007).
Almost no data exist on the neural basis of dialogic or con-
versational inner speech, and what there is has largely focused
on imagining words or sentences spoken in other voices (often
referred to as ‘auditory verbal imagery’). For example, Shergill
et al. (2001) asked participants either to silently rehearse sen-
tences of the form ‘I like x . . . ’ in their own voice (inner speech)
or to imagine sentences spoken in another voice in the second
or third person (auditory verbal imagery). While sentence repe-
tition was associated with activation of left IFG, superior tem-
poral gyrus (STG), insula and the SMA, imagined speech in
another person’s voice recruited a bilateral frontotemporal net-
work, including right IFG, left pre-central gyrus and right STG.
Similarly, in an AVH study by Linden et al. (2011), auditory im-
agery for familiar voices, such as conversations with family
members, was associated with bilateral activation in IFG, super-
ior temporal sulcus (STS), SMA and anterior cingulate cortex in
healthy participants.
Research on overt conversational processing has also impli-
cated a bilateral network including right frontal and temporal
homologues of left-sided language regions. For example, Caplan
and Dapretto (2001) compared judgements for logical and con-
textual violations of conversations in an functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) task. Whereas logic judgements were
associated with a left-sided Broca–Wernicke network, judge-
ments about pragmatic context recruited right inferior frontal
and middle temporal gyri, along with right prefrontal cortex
(PFC). The involvement of right frontotemporal regions in prag-
matic language processing is supported by evidence of selective
impairments in prosody, humour and figurative language in
cases of right-hemisphere damage (Mildner, 2007).
Finally, two recent studies by Yao et al. (2011; 2012) have
indicated a specific role for right auditory cortex in the internal
representation of other voices. In a study of silent reading, Yao
et al. (2011) examined activation of left and right auditory cortex
when participants read examples of direct and indirect speech
(e.g. ‘The man said ‘I like cricket’’ vs ‘The man said that he likes
cricket’). Reading of direct speech was specifically associated
with activation in middle and posterior right STS compared
with indirect speech. The same areas were also active in a se-
cond study (Yao et al., 2012) when participants listened to ex-
amples of direct speech read in a monotonous voice, but that
was not the case during listening to indirect speech. Yao et al.
argued that the activation of these regions during silent reading
and listening to monotonous direct speech might reflect an in-
ternal simulation of the suprasegmental features of speech,
such as tone and prosody.
Taken together, these findings suggest that dialogic forms of
inner speech are likely to draw on a range of regions beyond a
typical left-sided perisylvian language network, including the
right IFG, right middle temporal gyrus (MTG) and the right STG/
STS. Following Shergill et al. (2001) and, to a lesser degree, Yao
et al. (2011), it could be hypothesized that the involvement of
these regions is required for the simulation of other people’s
voices to complement one’s own inner speech. On such a view,
dialogic inner speech could be conceptualized simply as mono-
logic inner speech plus the phonological representation of other
voices, leading to recruitment of voice-selective regions of right
temporal cortex.
However, generating an internal conversation requires more
than simply mimicking the auditory qualities of the voices
involved. First, dialogic inner speech could draw on theory-of-
mind (ToM) capacities, requiring not only just the representa-
tion of a voice but also the sense and intention of a plausible
and realistic interlocutor. If dialogic inner speech utilized such
processes, then it should be possible to identify recruitment of
typical ToM regions, including medial PFC (mPFC), posterior cin-
gulate/precuneus and the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) area,
encompassing posterior STG, angular gyrus and inferior parietal
lobule (Spreng et al., 2009). Right TPJ has been associated with
ToM in a number of fMRI and positron emission tomography
(PET) studies, mostly based on false-belief tasks (Saxe and
Powell, 2006), while left TPJ has been linked to mental state rep-
resentation (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003) and understanding of
communicative intentions (Ciaramidaro et al., 2007). A view of
dialogic inner speech as drawing on ToM capacities would sug-
gest that it should be associated with established ToM networks
and posterior temporoparietal cortex, in addition to frontotem-
poral regions associated with voice representation.
A second key difference between dialogue and monologue
concerns their structure and complexity. Generating an internal
dialogue involves representational demands that are absent
from sentence repetition or subvocal rehearsal. Whereas, in
monologue, a single speaker’s voice or perspective is sufficient,
in dialogue more than one perspective must be generated,
maintained and adopted on an alternating basis (Fernyhough,
2009). Internally simulating a conversation could also involve
imagination of setting, spatial position and other details that
distinguish interlocutors. Therefore, any differences observed
between dialogic and monologic inner speech may not reflect
representation of other voices or agents, so much as indexing
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the requirement to generate and flexibly switch between con-
versational positions and situations ‘in the mind’s eye’. If dia-
logic inner speech depended on such skills, it might be expected
to recruit areas more typically associated with the generation
and control of mental imagery, such as middle frontal gyrus
(MFG), precuneus and superior parietal cortex (Zacks, 2007;
McNorgan, 2012).
There are therefore reasons to believe that the production of
dialogic inner speech will differ from monologic examples of
the same process in three ways: recruitment of regions involved
in representing other voices, involvement of ToM resources to
represent other agents and the activation of brain networks
involved in the generation and control of mental imagery. To
test these predictions, we employed a new fMRI paradigm for
eliciting monologic (i.e. verbal thinking from a single perspec-
tive) and dialogic inner speech, so that the neural correlates of
the two can be compared.
To investigate the cognitive processes involved in dialogic
inner speech, we used a conjunction analysis (Price and Friston,
1997) to compare dialogue-specific activation with two other
tasks: a ToM task (Walter et al., 2004) and a novel perspective-
switching task. The ToM task was chosen because it included
non-verbal scenarios requiring inferences about communica-
tion and the representation of other agents’ intentions; in this
way, any conjunction between dialogue and ToM should not re-
flect overlaps in the processing of verbalized language. The per-
spective-switching task was developed to match the switching
and imagery-generation demands of the dialogic task, while
avoiding the inclusion of social agents, which feature in many
existing perspective-switching tasks. Conjunctions observed be-
tween the perspective-switching and dialogic tasks should
therefore reflect similarities in structure and task demands, ra-
ther than representations of agents and mental states tapped in
the ToM task. We predicted that (i) dialogic inner speech—in
contrast to a monologic control condition—would activate not
only right-hemisphere language homologue regions such as
right IFG, MTG and STG but also areas typically associated with
ToM processing, such as the TPJ and (ii) any further differences
between dialogic and monologic scenarios would overlap with
networks associated with perspective switching and mental im-
agery, such as the MFG or the superior parietal lobule.
Materials and methods
Participants
Twenty-one individuals [6 male; age m(s.d.)¼ 24.38 (6.73) years]
were recruited from university settings. All participants were
right-handed, native English speakers with normal or cor-
rected-to-normal vision. No participants reported any history of
cardiovascular disease, neurological conditions or head injury.
Participants received either course credit or a gift voucher. All
procedures were approved by the local university ethics
committee.
Scanning materials and procedure
Participants completed three tasks in the scanner: inner speech,
ToM and perspective-switching (followed by an anatomical
scan). Each task was preceded by a single practice trial. All stim-
uli were presented using E-Prime 2.0 (Schneider et al., 2002).
Participants viewed stimuli by looking upwards at a mirror dir-
ected at a monitor (Cambridge Research Systems Ltd.
BOLDscreen MR Safe display; 1920 1200 resolution, refresh
rate 60 Hz) placed behind the scanner bore. Button press re-
sponses (all right-handed) were collected using a fiber-optic re-
sponse button box (Psychology Software Tools).
Inner speech. Participants were presented with a written descrip-
tion of a scenario involving either dialogue or monologue and
were asked to generate inner speech in that scenario until they
saw a cue to stop. Dialogic scenarios involved conversations
and interviews with familiar people (Table 1). Monologic scen-
arios were matched to dialogic scenarios for their content and
setting, but only included a single speaker. Instructions were
presented for 10 s, followed by a fixation cross (the cue for inner
speech) for 45 s and an intertrial interval of 3–5 s (including a
stop signal for 2 s). In total, five dialogic and five monologic
scenarios were presented. At the end of the scanning session,
participants were asked to rate out of 100 (i) how vividly they
imagined the scenarios, (ii) the vividness of any visual imagery
they used during the task and (iii) the everyday characteristics
of their own inner speech, using the VISQ (McCarthy-Jones and
Fernyhough, 2011). The imagery self-ratings were included to
check task compliance and to provide a control indicator of how
much participants drew on visual (rather than verbal) imagery
during the task. The VISQ was included for exploratory analysis
of how individual differences in everyday inner speech may
have affected task performance and related brain activations. It
includes four subscales: dialogic inner speech (items include,
e.g. ‘I talk back and forward to myself in my mind about things’),
evaluative/motivational inner speech (e.g. ‘I think in inner
speech about what I have done, and whether it was right or
not’), other people in inner speech (e.g. ‘I experience the voices
of other people asking me questions in my head’) and con-
densed inner speech (e.g. ‘I think to myself in words using brief
phrases and single words rather than full sentences’). The VISQ
has been shown to have good internal and test–retest reliability
(McCarthy-Jones and Fernyhough, 2011; Alderson-Day et al.,
2014).
Theory-of-mind. Using a cartoon-based ToM task from Walter
et al. (2004), participants viewed a sequence of three cartoons
depicting a simple story (‘Story’ phase) and were then prompted
to choose the logical end of the story from three options
(‘Choice’ phase). Stories either required deciphering of actors’
intentions (e.g. pointing to see if a seat was free) or reasoning
about physical causality (e.g. a football breaking some bottles).
To examine ToM skills relevant to inner speech, the ‘communi-
cative intention’ condition from Walter et al. (2004) was used, as
compared with the physical reasoning control condition. ‘Story’
phase images were presented sequentially for 3 s each, followed
Table 1. Dialogic and monologic scenarios in the inner-speech task
Scenario Dialogic Monologic
A visit to your
old school
Conversation with a
teacher
Making a speech to
students
A job interview Talking to the
interviewer
Doing a presentation
Calling a relative Conversation with
relative
Leaving a voicemail
Being in a
documentary
Doing an interview Speaking to camera
Meeting the
Prime Minister
Interviewing the PM Suggesting a new law
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by the ‘Choice’ phase for 7 s and a jittered intertrial interval of
7–11 s. A total of 10 ToM stories and 10 physical reasoning sto-
ries were presented in a random order. Participants indicated
which image completed the story (A, B or C) using a button box,
and their percentage accuracy was recorded.
Visual perspective switching. The timing and structure of the per-
spective-switching task was designed to match the inner-
speech task. Participants first viewed an instruction page (10 s)
describing a visual scene or object and asking them to imagine
it from a particular perspective, e.g. ‘Imagine a train viewed
from the outside. Try to picture what it looks like in your mind.’
Underneath, this was followed by an instruction to either
switch perspective when prompted by a cue (the ‘Switch’ condi-
tion) or to maintain the image from single perspective until
prompted to stop (the ‘Stick’ condition). In the Switch condition,
the instruction page was followed by a 45 s imagery phase, in
which every 7 s a cue appeared (either ‘OUTSIDE’ or ‘INSIDE’, 2 s
presentation). In the Stick condition, cues appeared with the
same regularity but only from one perspective (i.e. only
‘INSIDE’). After scanning, participants rated how vividly they
had imagined each scene/object, and how easy they found
switching between different viewpoints (rated out of 100).
Mock scanner behavioural task
Production of inner speech is difficult to verify objectively, leav-
ing open the possibility that any differences observed between
dialogic and monologic scenarios might not reflect underlying
inner speech processes. To explore this further, we ran a post
hoc behavioural study in a mock MRI scanner that replicated the
layout, conditions and stimulus setup of the 3T scanner used
for imaging. A separate set of 20 participants [2 male; age
m(s.d.)¼ 19.65 (1.31) years] attempted the original inner-speech
task and then rated a variety of phenomenological characteris-
tics for each dialogic and monologic scenario (see
Supplementary Materials for an example response sheet).
Specifically, participants rated each scenario for its (i) overall
vividness, (ii) presence of inner speech, (iii) presence of visual
imagery, (iv) vividness of one’s own voice, (v) vividness of other
voices, and (vi) the number of times there was a ‘switch’ in per-
spective, voice or role (items 1–5 were rated as percentages).
Following this, participants also attempted a novel version
of the inner-speech task that included articulatory suppression,
a commonly used secondary task that is thought to interfere
with inner speech use (e.g. Baddeley et al., 1984; Williams et al.,
2012). Specifically participants were asked to attempt the inner-
speech task again but while repeating a different day of the
week, out loud, for the duration of each scenario. The idea of
this was to test whether engaging with the inner-speech task
really did require use of inner speech to be performed success-
fully. To minimize effects of repeating the same scenarios, par-
ticipants were encouraged to modify each situation (i.e. imagine
speaking to a different relative) and only had to imagine scen-
arios for half the original time (22.5 s).
fMRI acquisition
All data were acquired at Durham University Neuroimaging
Centre using a 3T Magnetom Trio MRI system (Siemens Medical
Systems, Erlangen, Germany) with standard gradients and a 32-
channel head coil. T2*-weighted axial echo planar imaging (EPI)
scans were acquired parallel to the anterior/posterior commis-
sure line with the following parameters: field of view
(FOV)¼ 212 212 mm, flip angle (FA)¼ 90, repetition time
(TR)¼ 2160 ms, echo time (TE)¼ 30 ms, number of slices
(NS)¼ 35, slice thickness (ST)¼ 3.0 mm, interslice gap¼ 0.3 mm,
matrix size (MS)¼ 64 64. Images for each task were collected
as separate runs (280 volumes each per run). For each partici-
pant, an anatomical scan was acquired using a high-resolution
T1-weighted 3D-sequence (NS: 192; ST: 1 mm; MS: 512 512;
FOV: 256 256 mm; TE: 2.52 ms; TR: 2250 ms; FA 9).
Data analysis
All analyses were conducted using Statistical Parametric
Mapping (SPM), version 8 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive
Neurology, London, UK) implemented in MATLAB (2012b) (The
Mathworks Inc).
Images were realigned to the first image to correct for head
movement. After realignment, the signal measured in each slice
was shifted in time relative to the acquisition time of the middle
slice using a sinc interpolation to correct for different acquisi-
tion times. Volumes were then normalized into standard
stereotaxic anatomical MNI-space using the transformation
matrix calculated from the first EPI-scan of each subject and the
EPI-template. The default settings for normalization in SPM8
with 16 non-linear iterations and the standard EPI-template
supplied with SPM8 were used. The normalized data with a
resliced voxel size of 3 3 3mm were smoothed with a 6 mm
full width half maximum (FHWM) isotropic Gaussian kernel to
accommodate intersubject variation in brain anatomy. The
time-series data were high-pass filtered with a high-pass cutoff
of 1/128 Hz and first-order autocorrelations of the data were
estimated and corrected for. The first four volumes of each run
were discarded to allow for equilibrium of the T2 response.
Movement parameters from the realignment phase were visu-
ally inspected for outliers and included as regressors for single-
subject (first level) analyses.
Single-subject analyses were conducted using a general lin-
ear model. The inner-speech and perspective-switching tasks
were modelled as a block design with an instruction phase
(4 volumes) and imagery phase (17 volumes). For the inner-
speech task, three conditions were modelled in the analyses:
monologic inner speech (17v), dialogic inner speech (17v) and
the instruction phase (4v). The perspective-switching task was
modelled in an identical way, but with Switch and Stick condi-
tions instead of dialogic and monologic. The expected hemo-
dynamic response at stimulus onset was modelled as a block
design, convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response
function. Following Walter et al. (2004), the ToM task was mod-
elled as an event-related design with four regressors: ToM-
Story, ToM-Choice, Physical-Story and Physical-Choice.
Subsequently, parameter estimates of the regressor for each of
the different conditions were calculated from the least mean
squares fit of the model to the time-series. ‘Story’ and ‘Choice’
regressors on the ToM task were combined within each condi-
tion for the generation of contrast images (Walter et al., 2004).
For the inner-speech task, differences between parameter
estimates for dialogic and monologic inner speech were tested
within-subjects at the individual level, then tested at the group
level with a one sample t-test. Comparisons of dialogic and
monologic conditions with baseline were also made to provide
further information on each condition’s neural correlates. The
same procedure was applied for key comparisons on the ToM
task and perspective-switching task (ToM Reasoning> Physical
Reasoning and Switch>Stick, respectively). The contrasts be-
tween dialogic and monologic inner speech, ToM Reasoning
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and Physical Reasoning and Switch and Stick conditions were
then used in a conjunction analysis to assess shared compo-
nents of each task.
Because differences between dialogic and monologic inner
speech were expected to be relatively small, we chose a cluster
correction with a higher sensitivity to small sample sizes in
comparison to the SPM cluster correction. A cluster extent
threshold method (Slotnick et al., 2003; Slotnick and Schacter,
2004) was used to identify groups of contiguous voxels that
were active at a value of P< 0.05, corrected for multiple com-
parisons. A Monte Carlo simulation with 10 000 iterations was
used to estimate cluster thresholds based on the voxel-wise
probability of a Type 1 error. For a voxel-wise error of P< 0. 01,
a cluster of 11 or more voxels was required for P< 0.05, cor-
rected for multiple comparisons. For a voxel-wise error of
P< 0.001, clusters of 6 or more voxels were required for
P< 0.05, corrected. As the latter criterion has been recom-
mended to avoid false positives (Woo et al., 2014), the results
reported later are all significant at P< 0.05 (corrected) based on
a voxel-wise error of P< 0.001, unless otherwise stated. MNI
voxel positions were converted into equivalent Talairach and
Tournoux (1988) co-ordinates in MATLAB for anatomical label-
ling. All structure and Brodmann areas (BA) were labelled
using the Talairach Daemon applet (Lancaster et al., 2000).
Brain images were generated using SPM and MRICron (Rorden
et al., 2007).
Results
Two participants were excluded from the analyses due to move-
ment during the inner-speech task. Thus, the results later dis-
play data from a sample of 19 participants (5 male, age
m(s.d.)¼ 24.63 (7.01) years).
Inner speech
Table 2 displays the contrast between dialogic and monologic
inner speech (all clusters at P< 0.05, corr.). Significantly
increased activation for dialogic compared with monologic
inner speech was evident in STG bilaterally, left inferior and
medial frontal gyri and a collection of posterior midline
structures, including the left precuneus and right posterior cin-
gulate. The opposite contrast, Monologic>Dialogic inner
speech, did not identify any significant activations. Compared
with baseline, dialogic inner speech was associated with signifi-
cantly increased activation in left posterior insula (x¼39;
y¼18, z¼ 7; t¼ 4.38, P< 0.05, corr.) only. At more liberal thresh-
old levels (when the cluster extent was thresholded based on a
voxel-wise error of P< 0.01), both dialogic and monologic inner
speech were associated with left-hemisphere activation com-
pared with baseline, including the left IFG, medial frontal gyrus,
insula and caudate.
Self-ratings for vividness of inner speech scenarios were
high (m¼ 73.42, s.d.¼ 13.13). Vivid visual imagery was also re-
ported, although this tended to vary considerably across partici-
pants (m¼ 58.68, s.d.¼ 27.73, range¼ 0–100).
Theory-of-mind
The contrast between ToM and physical reasoning was associ-
ated with significant activation in anterior and posterior STG bi-
laterally, along with midline activation centring on left
precuneus (Table 3). Although left STG activity separated into an-
terior and posterior clusters, right STG activation was centred on
posterior areas close to the TPJ but evident all along the gyrus. In
contrast, physical reasoning compared with ToM reasoning
showed significantly greater recruitment of the left anterior lobe
of the cerebellum (27, 48, 12, t¼ 5.97), right cuneus (15, 82,
5; t¼ 5.73), right caudate (27, 41, 18; t¼ 3.88), left post-central
gyrus (45, 28, 36; t¼ 4.60) and left lingual gyrus (21, 80, 8;
t¼ 4.10). Performance on the ToM task was acceptable (Accuracy
m¼ 84.21%, s.d.¼ 10.03%, range¼65–100%).
Visual perspective switching
Compared with baseline, both the Switch and Stick conditions
of the perspective-switching task showed significant activa-
tion: the Switch condition was associated with activation of
left posterior insula (45, 7, 1; t¼ 4.16) and left STG (31, 1,
14; t¼ 4.78), while the Stick condition indicated activation of
right posterior insula (42, 4, 2, t¼ 5.14), left MFG (21, 7, 46;
t¼ 4.77), left IFG (45, 25, 5, t¼ 4.25) and right transverse
temporal gyrus (33, 27, 13, t¼ 4.08, all P< 0.05, corr.).
However, no significant differences were evident in the direct
contrast between the two conditions. Self-ratings for vivid-
ness of mental images were again high (m¼ 76.68, s.d.¼ 18.00),
as were ratings of ease in making shifts in perspective
(m¼ 75.53, s.d.¼ 21.85).
Table 2. Regions activated significantly more during dialogic inner
speech as compared with monologic inner speech (all P< 0.05, cor-
rected, minimal cluster size 6 voxels.)
BA x y z t No. of
voxels
L precuneus 31 15 58 34 7.44 566
R superior temporal gyrus 41 50 26 16 6.76 128
R superior temporal gyrus 13 42 47 21 6.70 16
R superior temporal gyrus 13 48 41 22 6.49 22
R cingulate gyrus 23 6 17 32 6.32 128
L medial frontal gyrus 9 0 35 34 6.28 158
L inferior frontal gyrus 47 24 29 11 5.87 14
R posterior cingulate 30 21 47 12 5.49 10
R posterior cingulate 31 24 58 15 5.49 27
L STG/insula 13 42 21 5 5.43 17
L cerebellum 30 48 17 5.08 28
L middle occipital gyrus 18 27 82 8 4.92 8
L thalamus 21 27 8 4.88 13
L superior temporal gyrus 13 45 46 17 4.59 6
R pre-central gyrus 9 36 6 31 4.23 11
R middle temporal gyrus 37 48 60 1 4.03 6
Table 3. Regions activated significantly more during theory-of-mind
(ToM) reasoning as compared with physical reasoning (all P< 0.05,
corr.)
BA x y z t No. of
voxels
L superior temporal gyrus 38 42 16 20 9.13 295
R superior temporal gyrus 13 48 41 20 9.00 556
L superior temporal gyrus 39 45 52 23 8.44 211
L precuneus 31 3 52 31 8.12 387
L cerebellum 9 34 8 5.58 12
R fusiform gyrus 37 42 40 15 5.38 10
R medial frontal gyrus 9 6 50 15 5.25 8
L parahippocampal gyrus 30 8 16 5.20 21
L thalamus 9 28 0 4.49 7
L parahippocampal gyrus 33 11 16 4.41 6
114 | Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2016, Vol. 11, No. 1
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/scan/article-abstract/11/1/110/2375153
by University of Northumbria user
on 27 June 2018
Conjunctions of inner speech, theory-of-mind and
perspective-switching
The contrasts between (i) dialogic and monologic inner speech
and (ii) ToM and physical reasoning were incorporated into a
conjunction analysis. As Figure 1 shows, only one cluster
showed significant activation differences for both contrasts,
centring on right posterior STG (48, 41, 20, t¼ 4.59, cluster
size¼ 15, P< 0.05, corr.). Using a voxel-wise error of P< 0.01 for
exploratory purposes, overlaps between the two tasks were also
evident in right anterior STG, precuneus, right MTG, left
paracentral lobule and right fusiform gyrus (all P< 0.05, corr.).
When a conjunction analysis was run comparing the
Dialogic>Monologic contrast and the Switch>Stick contrast,
no significant clusters were observed (all P> 0.05, corr.).
Overlaps at the lower significance threshold (voxel-wise
P< 0.01) were evident in a ventral cluster encompassing the
right posterior cingulate (3, 65, 10), the left cuneus (12, 68, 7)
and smaller clusters in right IFG (33, 31, 5) and left precuneus
(9, 60, 40).
Individual differences in inner speech
We examined correlations between (i) Dialogic>Monologic
inner speech activations and self-report scores for vividness
during the task and (ii) Dialogic>Monologic inner speech acti-
vations and self-report scores on the VISQ. These analyses re-
vealed very similar activation areas to the group analysis. Self-
report scores for vividness of the inner speech scenarios were
significantly associated with clusters in right posterior MTG
(36, 58, 15; t¼ 5.47, cluster size¼ 37) and right cingulate gyrus
(6, 23, 35; t¼ 4.93, cluster size¼ 9; P< 0.05, corr.). Scores on the
Dialogic Inner Speech subscale of the VISQ were associated with
a cluster in the same area of right MTG (39, 58, 15; t¼ 6.57, clus-
ter size¼ 10), along with two areas of the right precuneus ((i) 15,
67, 26; t¼ 4.89, cluster size¼ 11; (ii) 15, 49, 31; t¼ 4.66, cluster
size¼ 13; all P< 0.05, corr.). No significant associations were
observed for self-reported use of visual imagery nor for the
other components of the VISQ (evaluative, other people and
condensed inner speech).
Generating dialogic and monologic scenarios: the roles
of inner speech and imagery processes
Phenomenological ratings from the mock scanner version of the
task were used to examine use of inner speech and visual im-
agery across dialogic and monologic scenarios. As Table 4 indi-
cates, dialogic and monologic scenarios were equivalent in all
Fig. 1. Conjunction of dialogic inner speech and theory-of-mind. A cluster in right STG (Fig.1a) was evident for both dialogic inner speech>monologic inner speech and
ToM>physical reasoning, rendered here on the standard MNI brain supplied by SPM. Dialogic inner speech (Fig 1b; blue) was evident in right STG, cingulate and frontal
gyrus, while ToM (yellow) was associated with extensive right STG activation running posterior to anterior. Their conjunction (green) was at the posterior end of right
STG, in the TPJ area. ToM, Theory-of-mind; STG, superior temporal gyrus, all P<0.05, corr., clusters>6 voxels.
Table 4. Self-reported vividness ratings for dialogic and monologic
scenarios in mock scanner conditions
Dialogic Monologic
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Sig.
Vividness (overall) 62.45% 11.73% 63.00% 13.00%
In inner speech? 70.57% 19.23% 72.55% 22.37%
In visual imagery? 46.08% 20.76% 38.05% 22.84%
Vividness of own voice 69.90% 14.49% 73.40% 14.67%
Vividness of other voices 43.91% 20.76% 18.80% 17.60% ***
Number of switches 1.65 1.07 0.40 0.59 ***
***P<0.001 (Bonferroni-corrected P values used).
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respects bar vividness of other voices (t¼ 7.47, df¼ 19, P< 0.001)
and mean number of switches per scenario (t¼ 5.35, df¼ 19,
P< 0.001), both of which were more common for dialogic inner
speech (all P values are Bonferroni corrected). For both dialogic
and monologic scenarios, inner speech was present to a signifi-
cantly greater degree than visual imagery (dialogic: t¼ 3.21,
df¼ 19, P¼ 0.036; monologic: t¼ 3.79, df¼ 19, P ¼0.010). As may
be expected, vividness for one’s own voice was also stronger on
average than vividness of other voices (dialogic: t¼ 5.95, df¼ 19,
P< 0.001; monologic: t¼ 11.00, df¼ 19, P< 0.001).
Finally, Table 5 shows mean ratings for dialogic and mono-
logic scenarios combined, compared across the normal and ar-
ticulatory suppression versions of the task. Articulatory
suppression had the effect of lowering vividness ratings for
inner speech, one’s own voice and other voices but had no effect
on levels of visual imagery (P¼ 0.999) and number of switches
(P¼ 0.148).
Discussion
This study attempted to examine neural differences between
two varieties of internal self-talk: dialogic and monologic inner
speech. In line with the hypothesis that generating dialogic
scenarios would be associated with recruitment of a network
extending beyond the left frontotemporal language regions, dia-
logue was associated with significantly greater activation, com-
pared with monologue, in the precuneus, posterior cingulate
and the right STG (BA13 and BA41), alongside activation in left
insula, IFG, STG and cerebellum. Conjunction analysis identified
an overlap with ToM reasoning specifically in right posterior
STG, although shared substrates with visual perspective-
switching could not be fully assessed due to null results in the
contrast between switching and single-perspective imagery on
that particular task.
The involvement of a left-hemisphere network including
IFG, STG and the cerebellum during generation of dialogic scen-
arios is consistent with prior inner speech studies (Shergill et al.,
2001; Simons et al., 2010; Geva et al., 2011) and implies a greater
demand on these areas when a dialogue must be produced (in
contrast to a monologue). Although the IFG and insula are often
implicated in inner-speech tasks (although see Jones, 2009), ac-
tivations of posterior STG and lateral regions of temporal cortex
are observed depending on specific task demands, such as self-
monitoring of inner speech rate (Shergill et al., 2002) and phon-
ology (Aleman et al., 2005). The cerebellum, in contrast, has
been proposed to support maintenance of verbal working
memory (i.e. articulatory rehearsal) via its connections with
motor cortex (Marvel and Desmond, 2010).
Although a number of right-hemisphere regions were active
during the dialogic condition, there was less evidence to suggest
that this involved the specific recruitment of either language re-
gion homologues or voice-selective areas. For example, al-
though activation in the right STG was more anterior than in
the left STG, and was close to regions that have been previously
related to listening to familiar voices (Shah et al., 2001), it actu-
ally overlapped more with areas previously associated with spa-
tial rather than auditory processing (Ellison et al., 2004). This
suggests that the right-hemisphere differences between the dia-
logic and monologic conditions were not simply picking out
additional voice representation demands (cf. Shergill et al., 2001)
but relate instead to other cognitive factors.
The results of conjunction analysis indicated the involve-
ment of social-cognitive processes in dialogic scenarios.
Activity in posterior right STG was evident during both dialogic
scenarios and ToM reasoning, in a region previously linked to
both ToM (Fletcher et al., 1995) and imagery for personal per-
spectives (Ruby and Decety, 2001). It is also close to sections of
right TPJ that have been implicated in representation of other
people’s beliefs and states of knowledge (Saxe and Powell, 2006;
Sebastian et al., 2012). Along with ToM, right TPJ has been pro-
posed to play a role in managing divided attention and non–
ToM-based perspective switching (Mitchell, 2008; Aichhorn
et al., 2009), although there is debate as to whether these func-
tions are subserved by the same or separable components of
the TPJ (Scholz et al., 2009). Recent research on structural con-
nectivity suggests that TPJ splits into three separate subregions:
a dorsal component connecting to lateral anterior PFC, an anter-
ior region connecting to the ventral attentional network and a
posterior region connecting to social cognitive areas such as the
precuneus and posterior cingulate (Mars et al., 2012). The cluster
identified in this study would appear to be located between the
latter two putative sub-regions of the TPJ, implicating both so-
cial-cognitive and attentional processes.
Apart from right STG, there was evidence (at less conserva-
tive significance levels) of functional overlaps between dialogic
inner speech and ToM in an area of right MTG that has been
previously linked to retrieval of face-word associations (Henke
et al., 2003) and reflection on third-person traits (Kjaer et al.,
2002). There was also overlap in posterior midline structures, al-
though generally the two processes appeared to involve separ-
ate parts of the precuneus and posterior cingulate cortex, with
the ToM cluster much closer to the midline. Dialogic inner
speech also prompted activation in anterior medial frontal
gyrus but ToM reasoning did not (cf. Walter et al., 2004).
The involvement of anterior and posterior midline struc-
tures in the contrast between dialogic and monologic conditions
may indicate that the default mode network (DMN) is involved
in generating internal dialogue (Buckner et al., 2008). ToM, auto-
biographical memory and resting-state cognition have been
proposed to draw on a shared ‘core’ network including mPFC,
precuneus, posterior cingulate and TPJ (Spreng et al., 2009). If
the dialogic quality of inner speech imbues it (compared with
monologic inner speech) with qualities of open-endedness,
flexibility and creativity (Fernyhough, 1996, 2009), then it would
arguably draw on some of the same introspective processes
that the DMN is thought to underpin.
The remaining clusters identified in the contrast between
dialogic and monologic inner speech also point to a range
of processes associated with DMN functioning. Left precuneus
has been associated with the simulation of third-person
Table 5. Self-reported vividness ratings for inner speech scenarios in
mock scanner under normal conditions and during articulatory
suppression
Normal
conditions
Articulatory
suppression
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Sig.
Vividness (overall) 62.73% 11.93% 36.01% 16.54% ***
In inner speech? 71.56% 20.18% 32.12% 23.38% ***
In visual imagery? 42.07% 20.90% 44.60% 22.18%
Vividness of own voice 71.65% 14.31% 32.78% 20.77% ***
Vividness of other voices 31.36% 20.90% 15.88% 14.12% **
Number of switches 1.03 0.69 0.55 0.49
**P< 0.01, ***P<0.001 (Bonferroni-corrected P values used).
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perspectives (Ruby and Decety, 2001) and episodic memory re-
trieval (Zysset et al., 2002), while right posterior cingulate has
been linked to retrieval of autobiographical memories (Fink
et al., 1996; Ryan et al., 2001). One possibility is that dialogic scen-
arios simply place a greater demand on memory processes,
requiring the representation of specific events or people that
would otherwise not be needed for generating one’s own voice.
This seems unlikely, however, given that the monologic and
dialogic scenario pairs were chosen to have the same general
content (a school visit, a job interview, etc.), which should have
minimized any differences between the conditions in terms of
autobiographical memory demands. Alternatively, it may be
that the scene construction processes thought to underpin
autobiographical memory retrieval (Hassabis and Maguire,
2009) are similar to those recruited in producing a realistic and
immersive dialogue. A direct comparison of scene construction,
autobiographical memory and inner speech would be required
to parse out these possibilities.
The results from the individual differences analysis high-
lighted a slightly different range of activation foci to the group
contrast for dialogic>monologic inner speech: specifically, viv-
idness ratings correlated with activation in the right MTG and
cingulate gyrus, while dialogic inner speech (assessed as a gen-
eral trait) correlated with the same MTG area, plus two sections
of right precuneus. This contrasts with the involvement of ‘clas-
sic’ inner speech areas (left IFG, STG and cerebellum) and the
focus on right STG seen in the group analysis of dialogic vs
monologic inner speech.
The lack of correlates in the individual differences analysis
in left frontotemporal areas suggests that covert articulation,
per se, may not be so important for generating particularly vivid
or dialogic scenarios. Nevertheless, the other areas identified in
this analysis implicate similar processes and networks to the
group analysis. For instance, the right MTG and the two sections
of the right precuneus that correlated with dialogic inner speech
reports have previously been implicated in theory-of-mind
(Atique et al., 2011; Bru¨ne et al., 2011). Other regions identified in
this analysis are associated with processes that are also likely
to be involved in generating dialogic scenarios. For example,
right MTG has been associated with accurate and confident re-
call (Chua et al., 2006, Giovanello et al., 2010), while the right pre-
cuneus has been associated with retrieval of verbal episodic
memory (Fernandes et al., 2005), context-rich autobiographical
memories (Gilboa et al., 2004) and first-person perspectives
memories (sometimes called ‘field’ memories; Nigro and
Neisser, 1983; Eich et al., 2009). The activation of cingulate gyrus
for vividness ratings, though likely not specific to this process,
has been linked previously to a right anterior insula network
involved in affective engagement (Touroutoglou et al., 2012).
When these results are taken together, it might suggest that the
tendency to engage in dialogic inner speech in everyday life
does not reflect a trait towards ‘more’ inner speech—under-
stood simply as a greater frequency of covert articulation—but
instead indicates a greater tendency to recall and re-engage in
previous interactions with others, and perhaps even to use
these episodic memories to plan future social interactions.
Limitations
One-key limitation in interpreting the present results is the ex-
tent to which the inner-speech task actually elicited inner
speech. Participants were prompted to generate dialogic and
monologic scenarios in inner speech, but they may have varied
in their ability to do so, or may have drawn on other forms of
simulation (such as visual imagery). Similar imagery-generation
paradigms have been criticized in related fields (e.g. auditory im-
agery; Zatorre and Halpern, 2005) and in general it is preferable to
include an objective test of inner speech use, such as paradigms
that require participants to make rhyming judgements (Geva
et al., 2011) or to assess metric stress (Aleman et al., 2005).
To address this limitation, we gathered behavioural data
from a mock scanner task in which a separate set of partici-
pants reported on their imagery processes for each scenario
used during scanning. Scenario stimuli generally prompted
high levels of inner speech compared with visual imagery
across both dialogic and monologic scenarios, while both kinds
of scenario proved difficult to generate (in the sense of leading
to post-scan reports of vivid auditory imagery) when inner
speech was blocked via articulatory suppression (repeating days
of the week). Additional corroboration of the paradigm was pro-
vided by the individual differences analysis of inner speech
scores, which implicated broadly similar brain regions (right
posterior temporal and midline structures) and similar proc-
esses (Theory-of-Mind, autobiographical recall) to the main dia-
logic–monologic contrast.
Taken together, these data at least partly address the con-
cern that participants did not engage in inner speech in produc-
ing dialogic and monologic scenarios. Nevertheless, the results
presented here need to be replicated alongside a battery of other
inner speech measures that do not rely on participants’ self-
reports (Aleman et al., 2005), to fully assess the extent to which
our new paradigm elicits dialogic and monologic inner speech.
The individual difference correlates in particular require repli-
cation in a much larger sample than tested here.
A second limitation is that the perspective-switching task
did not produce consistent activation maps that could be used
in the conjunction analysis, thus limiting the assessment of
whether the dialogicality of inner speech depends purely on de-
mands associated with generating and coordinating mental im-
agery. A novel imagery task was deployed here to match the
structure and timing of the inner-speech task but it is possible
that a different task with similar demand characteristics would
have provided a better control. For instance, mental rotation
tasks involve demands to generate and flexibly manipulate
mental images, and are consistently associated with activation
in a network of frontoparietal regions (McNorgan, 2012).
Implications for psychopathology
Notwithstanding these caveats, the results presented here
could have important implications for understanding inner
speech in both typical and atypical populations. Although the
involvement of ToM-related networks in internal dialogue is
perhaps unsurprising, our conjunction analysis findings align
with the view that articulating different perspectives may be an
important feature of more complex forms of inner speech
(Fernyhough, 1996). Abnormalities in the interplay between
inner speech and ToM networks may thus explain some import-
ant findings in atypical groups.
As a first example, dominant models of AVH explain the
phenomenon in terms of misattributed inner speech but strug-
gle to explain why these hallucinations are distinctly experi-
enced in another person’s voice (Jones and Fernyhough, 2007).
Previous work has already suggested that dialogic conceptions
of inner speech may account for the presence of the voices of
others in one’s head (Fernyhough, 2004). Our present study ex-
tends this by showing commonalities between many of the
neural regions activated during AVH (such as left STG, left
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insula, left IFG) and those strongly activated during dialogic
inner speech (Jardri et al., 2011; Ku¨hn and Gallinat, 2012). Future
studies should test the proposal that findings from AVH re-
search can be accounted for by dialogic inner speech occurring
in conjunction with altered activity in other neural areas, such
as the SMA (McGuire et al., 1995; Raij and Riekki, 2012), causing it
to be experienced as non–self-produced. Our study also implies
that neuroscientific studies of AVH need to consider social-cog-
nitive networks alongside speech processing to fully under-
stand how such hallucinations occur (see also Bell, 2013).
As a second example, atypical ToM has for a long time been
considered a core feature of autism spectrum disorder (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985), but differences in inner speech in autism
have only been studied relatively recently (Whitehouse et al.,
2006; Wallace et al., 2009; Holland and Low, 2010). Early experi-
ence in autism is characterized by delays in language develop-
ment and significant difficulties with social and communicative
interaction (WHO, 1993). If inner speech is shaped by communi-
cative experience—as a Vygotskian approach would suggest—
then qualitative differences in the inner speech of people on the
autistic spectrum may also be expected (Fernyhough, 1996;
Williams et al., 2012). The data presented here are consistent
with the idea that there are important interconnections be-
tween atypical ToM skills and atypical inner speech, which may
mutually inform one another over the course of development.
The direction of this relationship remains to be explored: on the
one hand, problems with ToM could cause a qualitatively differ-
ent experience of inner speech in autism; on the other hand, a
lack of conversational or communicative inner speech might
impact ToM development through limiting opportunities for
dialogic interaction with others (Fernyhough, 2008).
In conclusion, we have presented the first neuroimaging
study of some important varieties of inner speech, focusing on
the contrast between dialogic and monologic forms of self-talk.
Our findings provide initial support for the idea that forms of
inner speech exist which can be both phenomenologically and
neurologically distinguished from the silent commentary of a
single inner voice. The data presented here suggest that gener-
ating silent dialogues draws on a wider network than classical
regions associated with language production and comprehen-
sion, including recruitment of a core part of the ToM network.
Further work is needed to disambiguate (i) the exact processes
shared between dialogic inner speech and ToM, (ii) the involve-
ment of the DMN in this conjunction and (iii) relative contribu-
tions of inner speech and forms of mental imagery to creating
vivid inner dialogues.
Acknowledgements
The authors thank Henrik Walter and Angela Ciaramidaro for
providing test materials for the Theory-of-Mind task. They also
thank Jon Simons for his helpful comments on the article.
Funding
This work was supported by the Wellcome Trust (WT098455).
S.M.J. was supported by an Australian Research Council
Discovery Early Career Researcher Award (DE140101077).
Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at SCAN online.
Conflict of interest. None declared.
References
Aichhorn, M., Perner, J., Weiss, B., Kronbichler, M., Staffen, W.,
Ladurner, G. (2009). Temporo-parietal junction activity in the-
ory-of-mind tasks: falseness, beliefs, or attention. Journal of
Cognitive Neuroscience, 21(6), 1179–92.
Alderson-Day, B. Fernyhough, C. (2015a). Inner speech: develop-
ment, cognitive functions, phenomenology, and neurobiology.
Psychological Bulletin, 141, 931–65.
Alderson-Day B., Fernyhough, C. (2015b). Relations among trait
and state measures of inner speech quality using smartphone
app experience sampling. Frontiers in Psychology, 6, 517.
Alderson-Day, B., McCarthy-Jones, S., Bedford, S., Collins, H.,
Dunne, H., Rooke, C., et al. (2014). Shot through with voices: dis-
sociation mediates the relationship between varieties of inner
speech and auditory hallucination proneness. Consciousness
and Cognition, 27, 288–96.
Aleman, A., Formisano, E., Koppenhagen, H., Hagoort, P., de
Haan, E.H.F., Kahn, R.S. (2005). The functional neuroanatomy
of metrical stress evaluation of perceived and imagined spo-
ken words. Cerebral Cortex, 15(2), 221–8.
Atique, B., Erb, M., Gharabaghi, A., Grodd, W., Anders, S. (2011).
Task-specific activity and connectivity within the mentalizing
network during emotion and intention mentalizing.
Neuroimage, 55(4), 1899–911.
Baddeley, A., Lewis, V., Vallar, G. (1984). Exploring the articula-
tory loop. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section
A, 36(2), 233–52.
Baron-Cohen, S., Leslie, A.M., Frith, U. (1985). Does the autistic
child have a “theory of mind”? Cognition, 21(1), 37–46.
Bell, V. (2013). A community of one: social cognition and auditory
verbal hallucinations. PLoS Biology, 11(12), e1001723.
Bentall, R.P. (1990). The illusion of reality: a review and integra-
tion of psychological research on hallucinations. Psychological
Bulletin, 107(1), 82–95.
Bru¨ne, M., O¨zgu¨rdal, S., Ansorge, N., von Reventlow, H.G., Peters,
S., Nicolas, V., et al. (2011). An fMRI study of “theory of mind” in
at-risk states of psychosis: comparison with manifest schizo-
phrenia and healthy controls. Neuroimage, 55(1), 329–37.
Buckner, R.L., Andrews-Hanna, J.R., Schacter, D.L. (2008). The
brain’s default network: anatomy, function, and relevance to
disease. Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 1124, 1–38.
Caplan, R., Dapretto, M. (2001). Making sense during conversa-
tion: an fMRI study. Neuroreport, 12(16), 3625–32.
Ciaramidaro, A., Adenzato, M., Enrici, I., Erk, S., Pia, L., Bara, B.G.,
et al. (2007). The intentional network: how the brain reads vari-
eties of intentions. Neuropsychologia, 45(13), 3105–13.
Chua, E.F., Schacter, D.L., Rand-Giovannetti, E., Sperling, R.A.
(2006). Understanding metamemory: neural correlates of the
cognitive process and subjective level of confidence in recogni-
tion memory. Neuroimage, 29(4), 1150–60.
D’Argembeau, A., Renaud, O., Van der Linden, M. (2011).
Frequency, characteristics and functions of future-oriented
thoughts in daily life. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25(1), 96–103.
Eich, E., Nelson, A.L., Leghari, M.A., Handy, T.C. (2009). Neural
systems mediating field and observer memories.
Neuropsychologia, 47(11), 2239–51.
Ellison, A., Schindler, I., Pattison, L.L., Milner, A.D. (2004). An
exploration of the role of the superior temporal gyrus in visual
search and spatial perception using TMS. Brain, 127(10),
2307–15.
Emerson, M.J., Miyake, A. (2003). The role of inner speech in task
switching: a dual-task investigation. Journal of Memory and
Language, 48(1), 148–68.
118 | Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2016, Vol. 11, No. 1
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/scan/article-abstract/11/1/110/2375153
by University of Northumbria user
on 27 June 2018
Fernandes, M.A., Moscovitch, M., Ziegler, M., Grady, C. (2005).
Brain regions associated with successful and unsuccessful re-
trieval of verbal episodic memory as revealed by divided atten-
tion. Neuropsychologia, 43(8), 1115–27.
Fernyhough, C. (1996). The dialogic mind: a dialogic approach
to the higher mental functions. New Ideas in Psychology, 14(1),
47–62.
Fernyhough, C. (2004). Alien voices and inner dialogue: towards
a developmental account of auditory verbal hallucinations.
New Ideas in Psychology, 22(1), 49–68.
Fernyhough, C. (2008). Getting Vygotskian about theory of mind:
mediation, dialogue, and the development of social under-
standing. Developmental Review, 28(2), 225–62.
Fernyhough, C. (2009). Dialogic thinking. In Winsler, A.,
Fernyhough, C., Montero, I. editors. Private Speech,
Executive Functioning, and the Development of Verbal Self-
Regulation, pp. 42–52, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Fernyhough, C. (2013). Inner speech. In Pashler, H., editor. The
Encyclopedia of the Mind, Vol. 9, pp. 418–20, Thousand Oaks, CA:
SAGE Publications.
Fink, G.R., Markowitsch, H.J., Reinkemeier, M., Bruckbauer, T.,
Kessler, J., Heiss, W.D. (1996). Cerebral representation of one’s
own past: neural networks involved in autobiographical mem-
ory. Journal of Neuroscience, 16(13), 4275–82.
Fletcher, P.C., Happe´, F., Frith, U., Baker, S.C., Dolan, R.J.,
Frackowiak, R.S.J., et al. (1995). Other minds in the brain: a func-
tional imaging study of “theory of mind” in story comprehen-
sion. Cognition, 57(2), 109–28.
Ford, J.M., Morris, S.E., Hoffman, R.E., Sommer, I., Waters, F.,
McCarthy-Jones, S., et al. (2014). Studying hallucinations within
the NIMH RDoC framework. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 40(Suppl. 4),
S295–304.
Frith, C. (1992). The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Schizophrenia.
Lawrence Erlbaum: Hove.
Geva, S., Jones, P.S., Crinion, J.T., Price, C.J., Baron, J.-C.,
Warburton, E.A. (2011). The neural correlates of inner speech
defined by voxel-based lesion-symptom mapping. Brain,
134(Pt 10), 3071–82.
Gilboa, A., Winocur, G., Grady, C.L., Hevenor, S.J., Moscovitch, M.
(2004). Remembering our past: functional neuroanatomy of
recollection of recent and very remote personal events.
Cerebral Cortex, 14(11), 1214–25.
Giovanello, K.S., Kensinger, E.A., Wong, A.T., Schacter, D.L.
(2010). Age-related neural changes during memory conjunc-
tion errors. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 22(7), 1348–61.
Hassabis, D., Maguire, E.A. (2009). The construction system of
the brain. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B:
Biological Sciences, 364(1521), 1263–71.
Henke, K., Mondadori, C.R.A., Treyer, V., Nitsch, R.M., Buck, A.,
Hock, C. (2003). Nonconscious formation and reactivation of
semantic associations by way of the medial temporal lobe.
Neuropsychologia, 41(8), 863–76.
Hinke, R.M., Hu, X., Stillman, A.E., Kim, S.G., Merkle, H., Salmi, R.,
et al. (1993). Functional magnetic resonance imaging of Broca’s
area during internal speech. Neuroreport, 4(6), 675–8.
Holland, L., Low, J. (2010). Do children with autism use inner
speech and visuospatial resources for the service of executive
control? Evidence from suppression in dual tasks. British
Journal of Developmental Psychology, 28(2), 369–91.
Jardri, R., Pouchet, A., Pins, D., Thomas, P. (2011). Cortical activa-
tions during auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia: a
coordinate-based meta-analysis. The American Journal of
Psychiatry, 168(1), 73–81.
Jones, S. (2009). The neuropsychology of covert and overt speech:
implications for the study of private speech in children and
adults. In Winsler, A., Fernyhough, C., Montero, I., editors.
Private Speech, Executive Functioning, and the Development of
Verbal Self-Regulation, pp. 69–80, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Jones, S.R., Fernyhough, C. (2007). Neural correlates of inner
speech and auditory verbal hallucinations: a critical review
and theoretical integration. Clinical Psychology Review, 27, 140–
54.
Kjaer, T.W., Nowak, M., Lou, H.C. (2002). Reflective self-aware-
ness and conscious states: PET evidence for a common midline
parietofrontal core. Neuroimage, 17(2), 1080–6.
Ku¨hn, S., Gallinat, J. (2012). Quantitative meta-analysis on state
and trait aspects of auditory verbal hallucinations in schizo-
phrenia. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 38(4), 779–86.
Lancaster, J.L., Woldorff, M.G., Parsons, L.M., Liotti, M., Freitas,
C.S., Rainey, L., et al. (2000). Automated Talairach atlas labels
for functional brain mapping. Human Brain Mapping, 10(3),
120–31.
Linden, D.E.J., Thornton, K., Kuswanto, C.N., Johnston, S.J., van
de Ven, V., Jackson, M.C. (2011). The brain’s voices: comparing
nonclinical auditory hallucinations and imagery. Cerebral
Cortex, 21(2), 330–7.
Mars, R.B., Sallet, J., Schu¨ffelgen, U., Jbabdi, S., Toni, I.,
Rushworth, M.F.S. (2012). Connectivity-based subdivisions of
the human right “temporoparietal junction area”: evidence for
different areas participating in different cortical networks.
Cerebral Cortex, 22(8), 1894–903.
Marvel, C.L., Desmond, J.E. (2010). Functional topography of the
cerebellum in verbal working memory. Neuropsychology Review,
20(3), 271–9.
McCarthy-Jones, S., Fernyhough, C. (2011). The varieties of inner
speech: links between quality of inner speech and psycho-
pathological variables in a sample of young adults.
Consciousness and Cognition, 20, 1586–93.
McGuire, P.K., David, A.S., Murray, R.M., Frackowiak, R.S.J., Frith,
C.D., Wright, I., et al. (1995). Abnormal monitoring of inner
speech: a physiological basis for auditory hallucinations. The
Lancet, 346(8975), 596–600.
McGuire, P.K., Silbersweig, D.A., Murray, R.M., David, A.S.,
Frackowiak, R.S., Frith, C.D. (1996). Functional anatomy of
inner speech and auditory verbal imagery. Psychological
Medicine, 26(1), 29–38.
McNorgan, C. (2012). A meta-analytic review of multisensory im-
agery identifies the neural correlates of modality-specific
and modality-general imagery. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience,
6, 285.
Mildner, V. (2007). The Cognitive Neuroscience of Human
Communication, 1st edn, New York: Psychology Press.
Mitchell, J.P. (2008). Activity in right temporo-parietal junction is
not selective for theory-of-mind. Cerebral Cortex, 18(2), 262–71.
Morin, A. (2009). Inner speech. In Bayne, T., Cleeremans, A., Wilken,
P., editors. Oxford Companion to Consciousness, pp. 380–2, Oxford:
OUP.
Morin, A., Uttl, B., Hamper, B. (2011). Self-reported frequency,
content, and functions of inner speech. Procedia - Social and
Behavioral Sciences, 30, 1714–8.
Nigro, G., Neisser, U. (1983). Point of view in personal memories.
Cognitive Psychology, 15(4), 467–82.
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2004). The response styles theory. In
Papageorgiou, C., Wells, A., editors. Depressive Rumination:
Nature, Theory and Treatment, pp. 107–24, Chichester: Wiley.
B. Alderson-Day et al. | 119
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/scan/article-abstract/11/1/110/2375153
by University of Northumbria user
on 27 June 2018
Price, C.J., Friston, K.J. (1997). Cognitive conjunction: a new
approach to brain activation experiments. Neuroimage, 5(4),
261–70.
Raij, T.T., Riekki, T.J.J. (2012). Poor supplementary motor area ac-
tivation differentiates auditory verbal hallucination from
imagining the hallucination. Neuroimage: Clinical, 1(1), 75–80.
Rorden, C., Karnath, H.-O., Bonilha, L. (2007). Improving lesion-
symptom mapping. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19(7),
1081–8.
Ruby, P., Decety, J. (2001). Effect of subjective perspective taking
during simulation of action: a PET investigation of agency.
Nature Neuroscience, 4(5), 546–50.
Ryan, L., Nadel, L., Keil, K., Putnam, K., Schnyer, D., Trouard, T.,
et al. (2001). Hippocampal complex and retrieval of recent and
very remote autobiographical memories: evidence from func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging in neurologically intact
people. Hippocampus, 11(6), 707–14.
Saxe, R., Kanwisher, N. (2003). People thinking about thinking
people. The role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of
mind.” Neuroimage, 19(4), 1835–42.
Saxe, R., Powell, L.J. (2006). It’s the thought that counts: specific
brain regions for one component of theory of mind.
Psychological Science, 17(8), 692–9.
Schneider, W., Eschman, A., Zuccolotto, A. (2002). E-Prime
Reference Guide. Pittsburgh: Psychology Software Tools, Inc.
Scholz, J., Triantafyllou, C., Whitfield-Gabrieli, S., Brown, E.N.,
Saxe, R. (2009). Distinct regions of right temporo-parietal junc-
tion are selective for theory of mind and exogenous attention.
PLoS One, 4(3), e4869.
Sebastian, C.L., Fontaine, N.M.G., Bird, G., Blakemore, S.-J., Brito,
S.A.D., McCrory, E.J. P., et al. (2012). Neural processing associ-
ated with cognitive and affective theory of mind in adoles-
cents and adults. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7(1),
53–63.
Shah, N.J., Marshall, J.C., Zafiris, O., Schwab, A., Zilles, K.,
Markowitsch, H.J., et al. (2001). The neural correlates of person
familiarity: a functional magnetic resonance imaging study
with clinical implications. Brain, 124(4), 804–15.
Shergill, S.S., Brammer, M.J., Fukuda, R., Bullmore, E., Amaro, E.,
Jr, Murray, R.M.,et al. (2002). Modulation of activity in temporal
cortex during generation of inner speech. Human Brain
Mapping, 16(4), 219–27.
Shergill, S.S., Bullmore, E.T., Brammer, M.J., Williams, S.C.,
Murray, R.M., McGuire, P.K. (2001). A functional study of audi-
tory verbal imagery. Psychological Medicine, 31(2), 241–53.
Simons, C.J.P., Tracy, D.K., Sanghera, K.K., O’Daly, O., Gilleen, J.,
Dominguez, M.-G., et al. (2010). Functional magnetic resonance
imaging of inner speech in schizophrenia. Biological Psychiatry,
67(3), 232–7.
Slotnick, S.D., Moo, L.R., Segal, J.B., Hart, J., Jr. (2003). Distinct pre-
frontal cortex activity associated with item memory and
source memory for visual shapes. Cognitive Brain Research,
17(1), 75–82.
Slotnick, S.D., Schacter, D.L. (2004). A sensory signature that dis-
tinguishes true from false memories. Nature Neuroscience, 7(6),
664–72.
Spreng, R.N., Mar, R.A., Kim, A.S.N. (2009). The common neural
basis of autobiographical memory, prospection, navigation,
theory of mind, and the default mode: a quantitative meta-
analysis. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 21(3), 489–510.
Talairach, J., Tournoux, P. (1988). Co-planar Stereotaxic Atlas of the
Human Brain: 3-dimensional Proportional System. Thieme Medical
Pub, New York.
Touroutoglou, A., Hollenbeck, M., Dickerson, B.C., Barrett, L.F.
(2012). Dissociable large-scale networks anchored in the right
anterior insula subserve affective experience and attention.
Neuroimage, 60(4), 1947–58.
Vygotsky, L.S. (1987). Thinking and Speech. The Collected Works of
Lev Vygotsky, Vol. 1, New York: Plenum Press.
Wallace, G.L., Anderson, M., Happe´, F. (2009). Brief report: infor-
mation processing speed is intact in autism but not correlated
with measured intelligence. Journal of Autism and Developmental
Disorders, 39(5), 809–14.
Walter, H., Adenzato, M., Ciaramidaro, A., Enrici, I., Pia, L., Bara,
B. (2004). Understanding intentions in social interaction: the
role of the anterior paracingulate cortex. Journal of Cognitive
Neuroscience, 16(10), 1854–63.
Whitehouse, A.J., Maybery, M.T., Durkin, K. (2006). Inner speech
impairments in autism. Journal of Child Psychology and
Psychiatry, 47(8), 857–65.
WHO. (1993). The ICD-10 Classification of Mental and Behavioural
Disorders: Diagnostic Criteria for Research. Geneva: World Health
Organization.
Williams, D., Bowler, D.M., Jarrold, C. (2012). Inner speech is used
to mediate short-term memory, but not planning, among in-
tellectually high-functioning adults with autism spectrum dis-
order. Development and Psychopathology, 24(01), 225–39.
Woo, C.-W., Krishnan, A., Wager, T.D. (2014). Cluster-extent
based thresholding in fMRI analyses: pitfalls and recommen-
dations. Neuroimage, 91, 412–9.
Yao, B., Belin, P., Scheepers, C. (2011). Silent reading of direct
versus indirect speech activates voice-selective areas in
the auditory cortex. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(10),
3146–52.
Yao, B., Belin, P., Scheepers, C. (2012). Brain “talks over” boring
quotes: top-down activation of voice-selective areas while lis-
tening to monotonous direct speech quotations. Neuroimage,
60(3), 1832–42.
Zacks, J.M. (2007). Neuroimaging studies of mental rotation: a
meta-analysis and review. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience,
20(1), 1–19.
Zatorre, R.J., Halpern, A.R. (2005). Mental concerts: musical im-
agery and auditory cortex. Neuron, 47(1), 9–12.
Zysset, S., Huber, O., Ferstl, E., von Cramon, D.Y. (2002). The an-
terior frontomedian cortex and evaluative judgment: an fMRI
study. Neuroimage, 15(4), 983–91.
120 | Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 2016, Vol. 11, No. 1
Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/scan/article-abstract/11/1/110/2375153
by University of Northumbria user
on 27 June 2018
